import python-jinja2-2.10.1-6.el8_10

SOURCES/CVE-2024-56326.patch

+From 2df1f7886e9e87face85569d5794ba690932c382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 12:37:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2024-56326
+
+---
+ Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/sandbox.py      | 65 +++++++++++++++-------------
+ Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_security.py | 17 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index 752e812..5516f96 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ import types
+ import operator
+ from collections import Mapping
++from functools import update_wrapper
+ from jinja2.environment import Environment
+ from jinja2.exceptions import SecurityError
+ from jinja2._compat import string_types, PY2
+@@ -134,16 +135,6 @@ class _MagicFormatMapping(Mapping):
+         return len(self._kwargs)
+ 
+ 
+-def inspect_format_method(callable):
+-    if not isinstance(callable, (types.MethodType,
+-                                 types.BuiltinMethodType)) or \
+-       callable.__name__ not in ('format', 'format_map'):
+-        return None
+-    obj = callable.__self__
+-    if isinstance(obj, string_types):
+-        return obj
+-
+-
+ def safe_range(*args):
+     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
+     MAX_RANGE items.
+@@ -372,6 +363,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+                     except AttributeError:
+                         pass
+                     else:
++                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++                        if fmt is not None:
++                            return fmt
+                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
+                             return value
+                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
+@@ -389,6 +383,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             except (TypeError, LookupError):
+                 pass
+         else:
++            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++            if fmt is not None:
++                return fmt
+             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
+                 return value
+             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
+@@ -402,34 +399,44 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             obj.__class__.__name__
+         ), name=attribute, obj=obj, exc=SecurityError)
+ 
+-    def format_string(self, s, args, kwargs, format_func=None):
+-        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
+-        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value):
++        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
++        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
++        also sandboxed.
+         """
+-        if isinstance(s, Markup):
+-            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, s.escape)
++        if not isinstance(
++            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
++        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++            return None
++        f_self = value.__self__
++        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
++            return None
++        str_type = type(f_self)
++        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
++        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
++            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
+ 
+-        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == 'format_map':
+-            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
+-                raise TypeError(
+-                    'format_map() takes exactly one argument %d given'
+-                    % (len(args) + (kwargs is not None))
+-                )
++        vformat = formatter.vformat
++        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
++            if is_format_map:
++                if kwargs:
++                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
++                if len(args) != 1:
++                    raise TypeError(
++                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                    )
++                kwargs = args[0]
++                args = ()
+ 
+-            kwargs = args[0]
+-            args = None
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
+-        kwargs = _MagicFormatMapping(args, kwargs)
+-        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
+-        return type(s)(rv)
++        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+ 
+     def call(__self, __context, __obj, *args, **kwargs):
+         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
+-        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
+-        if fmt is not None:
+-            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
+ 
+         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
+         # errors when proxying the call.
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_security.py
+index 5c8639c..1719644 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -206,3 +206,20 @@ class TestStringFormatMap(object):
+         env = SandboxedEnvironment()
+         t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}')
+         assert t.render() == 'a42b&lt;foo&gt;'
++
++    def test_indirect_call(self):
++        def run(value, arg):
++            return value.run(arg)
++
++        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
++        env.filters["run"] = run
++        t = env.from_string(
++            """{% set
++                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
++            %}
++            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
++            """
++        )
++
++        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
++            t.render()
+-- 
+2.48.0
+

SPECS/python-jinja2.spec

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        2.10.1
-Release:        5%{?dist}
+Release:        6%{?dist}
 Summary:        General purpose template engine
 Group:          Development/Languages
 License:        BSD
@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ Patch1:         CVE-2024-22195.patch
 # Resolved upstream: https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb
 Patch2:         CVE-2024-34064.patch
 
+# Security fix for CVE-2024-56326
+# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7
+# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2333856
+# Patch backported from upstream without changelog and typing.
+Patch3:         CVE-2024-56326.patch
+
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
 %description
@@ -126,6 +132,7 @@ environments.
 %patch0 -p1
 %patch1 -p1
 %patch2 -p1
+%patch3 -p1
 
 
 # cleanup
@@ -228,6 +235,10 @@ popd
 
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Jan 22 2025 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 2.10.1-6
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-56326
+Resolves: RHEL-74677
+
 * Tue May 07 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 2.10.1-5
 - Security fix for CVE-2024-34064
 Resolves: RHEL-35651